One comment by Steve Kerr in his ESPN interview by Simmons noted that the Suns look for Grant Hill and Boris Diaw to take some of the pressure off Nash this year. Unfortunately, Simmons made no follow up questions.
This is potentially a big deal. Since joining the Suns, the entire offense has been run through Nash and opponents have tried everything possible to stop him. The popular belief is "stop Nash and you stop the Suns".
It's easier to say "stop Nash" than to do it. The Spurs put master defender Bruce Bowen on him and really rouged Nash up. But for the series, Nash averaged 21.3 ppg on 48.4% shooting and shot 13 of 25 for three. Yet Nash stil dished out 12.7 assists per game.
If Bowen cannot stop Nash, it is hard to imagine anyone can. But there is a price. More and more teams are using double teams and simply pounding on him to wear him out. Some critics image the problem with Nash wearing out at the end of seasons is due to the number of minutes he plays. It isn't. It's the continual pounding he goes through.
How can Hill help? Back in the late 90's when Grant Hill was with the Pistons, he played quite a bit at point guard. From 1994-95 to 2000-01, he averaged over 5 assists per game every year including 7.3 assists per game in 1996-97.
Could Hill play point guard like Nash does? That's not feasible. But he could take some of the pressure off in the half court sets.
In the Suns offense there are three stages to what the point guard does:
1. Bring the Ball Up Court: The Suns try to bring the ball up court as quickly as possible. Barbosa is not viewed as a real point guard, but he can do that as well as anyone.
2. Early Offense: This is the part of the Suns offense which is run before the opponent's defense is set. Nash is absolutely amazing at finding the open man and making passes directly off the dribble.
3. Half Court Offense: Much of what the Suns do in the half court is run the pick and roll. Nash is outstanding at this, but it is the stage when opponents try to trap him, push him, grab him, and generally knock him about.
The idea appears to be to have Hill run the half court offense at least some of the time. This would not only cut down on the absue of Nash, but it would have at least one additional advantage. It would free up Nash to take more three point shots.
Nash is one of the top three point shooters in the NBA. Last year he finished 2nd with 45.5%. With Hill driving and kicking out to Nash, Nash would get a lot more open shots. Last year Nash ranked only 11th in three pointers made because he took fewer shots since it was Nash who was making the pass.
Will the Suns lose efficiency with Hill running the offense? Clearly no one runs the pick and roll like Nash. However, Hill is much bigger than Nash (listed at 6'8" 225 and is very good at attacking the basket. With his height, he can see over the defenders to make entry passes and overpower smaller guys when attacking the basket. He's also great at finishing at the basket. Nash averaged 66% inside the small circle, but Hill finished over 70%.
Using Hill at least part of the time in the half court offense should take some of the wear and tear on Nash's body while opening him up for more outside shooting. This could turn out to be a very big deal.
Friday, August 24, 2007
Sunday, August 19, 2007
Are The Suns Counting on Banks?
In another thread there was discussion that the Suns may simply wait out PJ on the belief that he will not sign with another team. If that's the case, it confirms the suspicion that they are not focused on getting him or any other big as a rotation player. But that leaves only 7 guiys in the rotation, which is not the way Coach D'Antoni does it.
Considering who is left beyond the top seven, (Banks, Marks, Pike, Tucker, and eventually Strawberry), it is not unreasonable to think that imagine are planning to use Banks in the rotation. If true, that will be a remarkable development.
The career of Marcus Banks has been erratic. The 12th pick in 2003, he was immediately traded to the Celtics, but did not do well there. In his first two and a half years his stats:
2003-04 5.9 ppg on 40% shooting and 31.4% for three with 2.2 assists in 17.1 minutes.
2004-05 4.6 ppg on 40.2% and 35.6% for three and 1.9 assists in 14.1 minutes
2005-06 (18 games) 5.5 ppg on 41.3% and 31.6% for three and 1.8 assists in 14.9 minutes
By this point, Banks was considered a bust by the Boston and other east coast reporters. His bad shooting pretty much had him written off as a flop, so his trade to the Wolves was barely noticed in Boston.
However, in Minnesota, he played surprisingly well:
2005-06 (in 40 games with the Wolves) 12.0 ppg, 47.9% and 36.4% for three with 4.7 assists in 30.7 minutes. While more of a combo than a real point guard, he finally looked like a real player. But when he came to the Suns, his career took a big step backward.
The Suns are known for tracking players based on the plus/minus stats when on the court. Does the team improve against the opponent or lose ground? There are many reasons why a guy's plus/minus will be poor (good shooters who cannot defend or guys who make a lot of turnovers), but there is little doubt that bad shooting will hurt. Lst Nobember, Banks shot very badly. What is worse, his overall plus/minus for the season was an awful -13.3 http://www.82games.com/0607/0607PHO.HTM
In November, Banks shot 20 of 59 for 33.9% from the field and just 1 of 8 for three. He averaged 11.7 minutes a game. He made just 1.2 assists per game (0.10 per minute) which was well below the per minute rate of 0.15 assists per minute with the Wolves. In practical terms, Banks shot himself out of the rotation and never worked his way back in.
He shot a little better in Deember, going 9 of 19, but shot only 13 of 33 (39.9%) in January and just 1 of 8 for three. His stats in February actually picked up in the few games he played while Nash was out: 9.1 ppg on 50.8% shooting (32 of 63) in 19.4 minutes. But it wasn't enough to get him playing time the rest of the season as he had only 28 minutes total from then on.
Banks' improved shooting in February did not do anything to improve his trade value. It was widely reported that the Suns tried to trade him and could not get anybody to take him for less than two first round picks. Everyone looked at his plus/minus and knew his reputation from Boston. The Suns could not move him.
It seemed like the Suns had given up on him, but Banks spent the off season working to correct his fatal flaw: poor shooting. And to prove he had made progress, he volunteered to play on the Suns summer leage team which is rare for guy with four years in the leage. But it appears to have been a good move for him.
Summer league does not mean a lot in that the opposition is often quite poor, but Banks demonstrated that he has worked on his shooting. In the only official game, he went 13 of 19 (68.4%) and 4 of 5 for three as he scored 42 points. The next day in a scrimmage against the Pistons, he shot 7 of 8. A few weeks later, the Suns signed Jay Humphries as an assistant coach. Jay said his first priority would be to work with Banks.
Have the Suns changed their view of Banks from a liability to a rotation player? Probably, but not entirely. Humphries suggested that Banks has struggled with the transition to the Suns style. He did not elaborate, but this is probably that the Suns focus on "find the open man/shoot if you are open" style which is very different from the "beat your man off the dribble" style most teams use.
Banks can beat his man off the dribble. The key is to integrate it into the offense the way Barbosa does, rather than getting caught dribbling around on the perimeter. But if he can, he could be a big part of the Suns team this year.
One of the reasons the Suns signed Banks is that he is good man on man defender. He's not only very quick but also very strong. When matching up against the Spurs' Tony Parker, this is something the Suns really need. But this can only happen if Banks is able to shoot.
If Banks can become the guy the Suns thought they signed a year ago, it could change the way the Suns play. Banks and Barbosa are two of the fastest players in the NBA and so quick few defenders can stay in front of them. But even if a team has someone capable of staying in front on one of these guys, no one has the ability to stay in front of both.
Considering who is left beyond the top seven, (Banks, Marks, Pike, Tucker, and eventually Strawberry), it is not unreasonable to think that imagine are planning to use Banks in the rotation. If true, that will be a remarkable development.
The career of Marcus Banks has been erratic. The 12th pick in 2003, he was immediately traded to the Celtics, but did not do well there. In his first two and a half years his stats:
2003-04 5.9 ppg on 40% shooting and 31.4% for three with 2.2 assists in 17.1 minutes.
2004-05 4.6 ppg on 40.2% and 35.6% for three and 1.9 assists in 14.1 minutes
2005-06 (18 games) 5.5 ppg on 41.3% and 31.6% for three and 1.8 assists in 14.9 minutes
By this point, Banks was considered a bust by the Boston and other east coast reporters. His bad shooting pretty much had him written off as a flop, so his trade to the Wolves was barely noticed in Boston.
However, in Minnesota, he played surprisingly well:
2005-06 (in 40 games with the Wolves) 12.0 ppg, 47.9% and 36.4% for three with 4.7 assists in 30.7 minutes. While more of a combo than a real point guard, he finally looked like a real player. But when he came to the Suns, his career took a big step backward.
The Suns are known for tracking players based on the plus/minus stats when on the court. Does the team improve against the opponent or lose ground? There are many reasons why a guy's plus/minus will be poor (good shooters who cannot defend or guys who make a lot of turnovers), but there is little doubt that bad shooting will hurt. Lst Nobember, Banks shot very badly. What is worse, his overall plus/minus for the season was an awful -13.3 http://www.82games.com/0607/0607PHO.HTM
In November, Banks shot 20 of 59 for 33.9% from the field and just 1 of 8 for three. He averaged 11.7 minutes a game. He made just 1.2 assists per game (0.10 per minute) which was well below the per minute rate of 0.15 assists per minute with the Wolves. In practical terms, Banks shot himself out of the rotation and never worked his way back in.
He shot a little better in Deember, going 9 of 19, but shot only 13 of 33 (39.9%) in January and just 1 of 8 for three. His stats in February actually picked up in the few games he played while Nash was out: 9.1 ppg on 50.8% shooting (32 of 63) in 19.4 minutes. But it wasn't enough to get him playing time the rest of the season as he had only 28 minutes total from then on.
Banks' improved shooting in February did not do anything to improve his trade value. It was widely reported that the Suns tried to trade him and could not get anybody to take him for less than two first round picks. Everyone looked at his plus/minus and knew his reputation from Boston. The Suns could not move him.
It seemed like the Suns had given up on him, but Banks spent the off season working to correct his fatal flaw: poor shooting. And to prove he had made progress, he volunteered to play on the Suns summer leage team which is rare for guy with four years in the leage. But it appears to have been a good move for him.
Summer league does not mean a lot in that the opposition is often quite poor, but Banks demonstrated that he has worked on his shooting. In the only official game, he went 13 of 19 (68.4%) and 4 of 5 for three as he scored 42 points. The next day in a scrimmage against the Pistons, he shot 7 of 8. A few weeks later, the Suns signed Jay Humphries as an assistant coach. Jay said his first priority would be to work with Banks.
Have the Suns changed their view of Banks from a liability to a rotation player? Probably, but not entirely. Humphries suggested that Banks has struggled with the transition to the Suns style. He did not elaborate, but this is probably that the Suns focus on "find the open man/shoot if you are open" style which is very different from the "beat your man off the dribble" style most teams use.
Banks can beat his man off the dribble. The key is to integrate it into the offense the way Barbosa does, rather than getting caught dribbling around on the perimeter. But if he can, he could be a big part of the Suns team this year.
One of the reasons the Suns signed Banks is that he is good man on man defender. He's not only very quick but also very strong. When matching up against the Spurs' Tony Parker, this is something the Suns really need. But this can only happen if Banks is able to shoot.
If Banks can become the guy the Suns thought they signed a year ago, it could change the way the Suns play. Banks and Barbosa are two of the fastest players in the NBA and so quick few defenders can stay in front of them. But even if a team has someone capable of staying in front on one of these guys, no one has the ability to stay in front of both.
Friday, August 17, 2007
Mavs Versus Suns On the Inside
The Suns have reputation for being an "outside shooting" team, but when it comes to low post/pick and roll plays they were far better than the Mavericks last season. This did not stop the Mavs from winning 67 games, but really came back to haunt the Mavs in the playoffs.
There is was a lot of talk that Nowitzki was becoming more of a low post threat, but that statistics do not really back that up. Using statistics taken from http://www.nba.com/hotzones/popup.html for 2006-07,
Dirk's regular season stats give a strong indication of the typ of player he is. Hot zone showed him taking 1339 shots during the regular season (officially he took 1341)
316 close (layups and tips)
379 short range
473 mid range
171 three point
In short, his his layups (post moves, tip in, pick and roll, etc) were just 23.6% of this shots. In 2005-06 Dirk took 364 close in shots of 1564, or 23.3% of his shots which was no real change.
Compare Dirk's shooting to Stoudemire's. Amare took 715 of his 1055 shoots in close, for 67.8% of his shots. Dirk hit 55.4% of his close in shots while Stoudemire hit 64.6% of his shots.
Dirk is a terrific shooter, but he is not really much of a low post threat. It is shocking to realize that Boris Diaw made more close in shots than Dirk (188 to 175), yet Dirk had 1341 total shots to Diaw's 569 shots (Diaw hit 65.3% of his close shots).
For the Mavs, their only "low post threat' was Dampier who took 328 close shots, 98.2% of this shots and hit 63.1%). Diop took 134 of 151 in close for 90.5% of his shots but hit only 49.3%.
Comparing the Suns top three inside guys with the Mavs top three is very illuminating considering the Suns play mostly small ball.
175 of 316 Dirk
207 of 328 Dampier
66 of 134 Diop
------------
448 of 778 for 57.6%
462 of 715 Stoudemire
188 of 288 Diaw
59 of 94 Thomas
-------------
709 of 1097 for 64.6%
Stoudemire along scored more close in shots that the Maverick's big three combined. The Mavericks can use their size to dominate the boards, but not when it comes to inside scoring.
There is was a lot of talk that Nowitzki was becoming more of a low post threat, but that statistics do not really back that up. Using statistics taken from http://www.nba.com/hotzones/popup.html for 2006-07,
Dirk's regular season stats give a strong indication of the typ of player he is. Hot zone showed him taking 1339 shots during the regular season (officially he took 1341)
316 close (layups and tips)
379 short range
473 mid range
171 three point
In short, his his layups (post moves, tip in, pick and roll, etc) were just 23.6% of this shots. In 2005-06 Dirk took 364 close in shots of 1564, or 23.3% of his shots which was no real change.
Compare Dirk's shooting to Stoudemire's. Amare took 715 of his 1055 shoots in close, for 67.8% of his shots. Dirk hit 55.4% of his close in shots while Stoudemire hit 64.6% of his shots.
Dirk is a terrific shooter, but he is not really much of a low post threat. It is shocking to realize that Boris Diaw made more close in shots than Dirk (188 to 175), yet Dirk had 1341 total shots to Diaw's 569 shots (Diaw hit 65.3% of his close shots).
For the Mavs, their only "low post threat' was Dampier who took 328 close shots, 98.2% of this shots and hit 63.1%). Diop took 134 of 151 in close for 90.5% of his shots but hit only 49.3%.
Comparing the Suns top three inside guys with the Mavs top three is very illuminating considering the Suns play mostly small ball.
175 of 316 Dirk
207 of 328 Dampier
66 of 134 Diop
------------
448 of 778 for 57.6%
462 of 715 Stoudemire
188 of 288 Diaw
59 of 94 Thomas
-------------
709 of 1097 for 64.6%
Stoudemire along scored more close in shots that the Maverick's big three combined. The Mavericks can use their size to dominate the boards, but not when it comes to inside scoring.
Saturday, August 11, 2007
Rebounding - Suns Primary Challenge
The Suns are going to need to focus on improving their rebounding this season. Losing Kurt Thomas will remove 5.7 rpg from a team that was already a net -2.3 rpg down.
Even with KT, the Suns were not a very good rebounding team. Last season they ranked #24 in net rebounding differential just behind Washington. Of playoff teams, only Toronto and Golden State ranked lower than the Suns. Only three of the top ten net rebounding teams did not make the playoffs: Knicks, Hornets, and Clippers.
None of this is new for the Suns. It is notable that the other poor rebounding playoff teams are also running teams. Releasing on the break reduces the number players staying back for the rebounds.
On the plus side, bad shooting teams tend to rebound more because they have more chances to get offensive rebounds. Two good examples are Houston which ranked 5th worst in shooting (44.5%) and 4th best in rebounding at 43.32 rpg. Cleveland was 7th in shooting at 44.7% and second in rebounding at 43.51 rpg.
Still, it is hard to win championships without good rebounding. In the final 8, only the Suns and Warriors had significantly negitive net rebounding numbers for the regular season.
Spurs +1.58
Cavs +3.65
Jazz +5.48
Pistons -0.65
Suns -2.52
Warriors -5.01
Bulls +2.78
Nets -0.56
Total emphasis on rebounding is not necesssary. The Spurs ranked only 10th in net rebounding during the regular season and actually were net -0.10 in the playoffs. But teams need to be competative on the boards and the Suns were not.
It is tempting to focus strictly on getting another big man to replace Kurt Thomas. That should help, but the bigger issue is going to be for the Suns as a team put more focus on rebounding. Everybody has to scramble for the ball.
None the less, to compete the Suns will have see improvements by Amare Stoudemire, Shawn Marion, and Boris Diaw. Last season KT averaged 0.31 rebounds per minute while doing a very good job of blocking out, so there is a lot to make up for.
Last season Amare upped his rebounding to 9.6 rpg in 32.8 minutes for a very good 0.293 per minute rate after being at 0.246 per minute in 2004-05. He can do it as shown by his 0.353 per minute rate in the playoffs, but he needs to bring that all the time. Equally important, he needs to do a better job of blocking out and not simply get rebounds that Marion would otherwise get.
Marion averaged 10.4 rpg in the playoffs, but that was only 0.251 per minute. During the regular season he averaged 0.26 per minute. This is a significant drop from 2005-06 when he averaged 11.8 rpg and 0.291 per minute. Some of this drop may be due to Stoudemire and more minutes by KT than the prior year; but Marion will have to get much closer to 0.3 per minute for the Suns to compete on the boards.
If Stoudemire and Marion need to improve somewhat, Diaw is going to have to improve dramatically. So far he has not proven to be even close to being an adequate rebounder. In 2005-06 he averaged 6.9 rpg or 0.19 per minute. Last year he dropped to 4.8 rpg for just 0.154 per minute (due in part to being moved to SF).
It is not that Boris cannot rebound, but he goes through periods when he just doesn't. In December he had three games with double digit rebounding, yet had two games with 0. In late February and early March he had 10 games in a row with 0 boards. There is some reason to think Diaw was struggling with back problems. If that is the case, they need him to be in better condition and healthy because he has a lot of slack he needs to make up for.
The rest of the team will have to step up their efforts to get scramble rebounds, but there is not a lot of size in the backcourt.
Grant Hill is likely to be more productive as a rebounder than Jame Jones, but his main value may as release man on the break which would permit Marion to stay back and rebound.
If the Suns hope to win a championship, they are going to have to "earn it" on the boards.
Even with KT, the Suns were not a very good rebounding team. Last season they ranked #24 in net rebounding differential just behind Washington. Of playoff teams, only Toronto and Golden State ranked lower than the Suns. Only three of the top ten net rebounding teams did not make the playoffs: Knicks, Hornets, and Clippers.
None of this is new for the Suns. It is notable that the other poor rebounding playoff teams are also running teams. Releasing on the break reduces the number players staying back for the rebounds.
On the plus side, bad shooting teams tend to rebound more because they have more chances to get offensive rebounds. Two good examples are Houston which ranked 5th worst in shooting (44.5%) and 4th best in rebounding at 43.32 rpg. Cleveland was 7th in shooting at 44.7% and second in rebounding at 43.51 rpg.
Still, it is hard to win championships without good rebounding. In the final 8, only the Suns and Warriors had significantly negitive net rebounding numbers for the regular season.
Spurs +1.58
Cavs +3.65
Jazz +5.48
Pistons -0.65
Suns -2.52
Warriors -5.01
Bulls +2.78
Nets -0.56
Total emphasis on rebounding is not necesssary. The Spurs ranked only 10th in net rebounding during the regular season and actually were net -0.10 in the playoffs. But teams need to be competative on the boards and the Suns were not.
It is tempting to focus strictly on getting another big man to replace Kurt Thomas. That should help, but the bigger issue is going to be for the Suns as a team put more focus on rebounding. Everybody has to scramble for the ball.
None the less, to compete the Suns will have see improvements by Amare Stoudemire, Shawn Marion, and Boris Diaw. Last season KT averaged 0.31 rebounds per minute while doing a very good job of blocking out, so there is a lot to make up for.
Last season Amare upped his rebounding to 9.6 rpg in 32.8 minutes for a very good 0.293 per minute rate after being at 0.246 per minute in 2004-05. He can do it as shown by his 0.353 per minute rate in the playoffs, but he needs to bring that all the time. Equally important, he needs to do a better job of blocking out and not simply get rebounds that Marion would otherwise get.
Marion averaged 10.4 rpg in the playoffs, but that was only 0.251 per minute. During the regular season he averaged 0.26 per minute. This is a significant drop from 2005-06 when he averaged 11.8 rpg and 0.291 per minute. Some of this drop may be due to Stoudemire and more minutes by KT than the prior year; but Marion will have to get much closer to 0.3 per minute for the Suns to compete on the boards.
If Stoudemire and Marion need to improve somewhat, Diaw is going to have to improve dramatically. So far he has not proven to be even close to being an adequate rebounder. In 2005-06 he averaged 6.9 rpg or 0.19 per minute. Last year he dropped to 4.8 rpg for just 0.154 per minute (due in part to being moved to SF).
It is not that Boris cannot rebound, but he goes through periods when he just doesn't. In December he had three games with double digit rebounding, yet had two games with 0. In late February and early March he had 10 games in a row with 0 boards. There is some reason to think Diaw was struggling with back problems. If that is the case, they need him to be in better condition and healthy because he has a lot of slack he needs to make up for.
The rest of the team will have to step up their efforts to get scramble rebounds, but there is not a lot of size in the backcourt.
Grant Hill is likely to be more productive as a rebounder than Jame Jones, but his main value may as release man on the break which would permit Marion to stay back and rebound.
If the Suns hope to win a championship, they are going to have to "earn it" on the boards.
Wednesday, August 8, 2007
Thinking About Boris
One of the most common concerns expressed last summer was that Diaw needed the ball in his hands at the elbow. This would conflict with how Amare is used. That is exactly what happened and Diaw was not nearly as effective as he was the year before.
In 2005-06, Boris took 852 shots compred to 566 in 2006-07. Mostly he shoots layups (or other shots in close). When he shoots in close, he hits 65.3% of his attemps.
More than anything else, the Suns offense is based on spreading the floor. Sticking Boris on the wing being guarded by wing meant he had a lot further to go to get to the basket and thus plenty of time for weak side help to come over. Granted, Boris has a tendency to pass out rather than accept contact in finishing. But unless you are Barbosa, it is hard to get to the basket from that distance without contact.
In 2005-06, Boris was matched against centers from the high post. His mid range shooting was pretty good at 44.5% But his real sweet spot is the left elbow where he hit 51.6% and 53.8% in 2005-06. Opponents had to come out to guard him.
Using Boris at the high post means the Suns can still run the pick and roll, but it is somewhat different with Boris than Amare. Amare is a great finisher while Boris is more inclined to pass.. Still, Boris was not bad at getting to the basket in 2005-06 (460 attempts) and last season hit 65.3% in close.
While Boris does not finish like Amare, running the ball through the high post with Boris gives the team some other options.
1. Short jumper when the defense hangs back.
2. Attack the basket following a pump fake.
3. Drive and kick when a help defender comes over to guard.
4. Post up the defender if a small guy comes out to guard.
5. Run back door plays and other passes to cutters
6 Run the give and go using penitrators.
7. Pass to shooters who run off screens (Nash becomes another outside shooter in this scheme)
When both Boris and Amare are in the lineup, it would mean moving Amare to the left low post. If the defender comes out to deal with Diaw, it would leave Amare defended by one guy when Boris makes a dump off pass following a drive.
Errntknght and I have been talking about the need to develop a high post offense for a while (different versions though). The decision to move Diaw permanently to the high post suggests that at least something of this kind is being contemplated. If nothing else, it would create a new set of problems for defenses that try to defense the Suns by stopping Nash.
In 2005-06, Boris took 852 shots compred to 566 in 2006-07. Mostly he shoots layups (or other shots in close). When he shoots in close, he hits 65.3% of his attemps.
More than anything else, the Suns offense is based on spreading the floor. Sticking Boris on the wing being guarded by wing meant he had a lot further to go to get to the basket and thus plenty of time for weak side help to come over. Granted, Boris has a tendency to pass out rather than accept contact in finishing. But unless you are Barbosa, it is hard to get to the basket from that distance without contact.
In 2005-06, Boris was matched against centers from the high post. His mid range shooting was pretty good at 44.5% But his real sweet spot is the left elbow where he hit 51.6% and 53.8% in 2005-06. Opponents had to come out to guard him.
Using Boris at the high post means the Suns can still run the pick and roll, but it is somewhat different with Boris than Amare. Amare is a great finisher while Boris is more inclined to pass.. Still, Boris was not bad at getting to the basket in 2005-06 (460 attempts) and last season hit 65.3% in close.
While Boris does not finish like Amare, running the ball through the high post with Boris gives the team some other options.
1. Short jumper when the defense hangs back.
2. Attack the basket following a pump fake.
3. Drive and kick when a help defender comes over to guard.
4. Post up the defender if a small guy comes out to guard.
5. Run back door plays and other passes to cutters
6 Run the give and go using penitrators.
7. Pass to shooters who run off screens (Nash becomes another outside shooter in this scheme)
When both Boris and Amare are in the lineup, it would mean moving Amare to the left low post. If the defender comes out to deal with Diaw, it would leave Amare defended by one guy when Boris makes a dump off pass following a drive.
Errntknght and I have been talking about the need to develop a high post offense for a while (different versions though). The decision to move Diaw permanently to the high post suggests that at least something of this kind is being contemplated. If nothing else, it would create a new set of problems for defenses that try to defense the Suns by stopping Nash.
Sunday, August 5, 2007
Marion Feels Unappreciated
It seems that from the minute Marion signed his contract, there has been a target on his back. He has been subject to constant criticism. It was a mistake to pay that much for a guy with his kind of skills, but he gets blamed for the contract, rather than the Colangelos.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Marion Feels Unappreciated
It seems that from the minute Marion signed his contract, there has been a target on his back. He has been subject to constant criticism. It was a mistake to pay that much for a guy with his kind of skills, but he gets blamed for the contract, rather than the Colangelos.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Marion Feels Unappreciated
It seems that from the minute Marion signed his contract, there has been a target on his back. He has been subject to constant criticism. It was a mistake to pay that much for a guy with his kind of skills, but he gets blamed for the contract, rather than the Colangelos.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Marion's main issue is that he's not a good "one-on-one" offensive player. Offensively, he is best used on breaks and as a cutter. His outside shooting is erratic and is not much of a ball handler. But he does the "alley oop" play better than anybody and is amazing at how quickly he can put offensive rebounds back in.
The problem is his half court one-on-one skills. Curiously enough, other than a decline in his three point shooting from early in his career, he's the same guy he was back when he signed the contract. Indeed, in orther areas of the game such as man defense he is far improved (smoother and less gambling). But offensively, his improved offense is mostly a function of the Suns scheme rather than his ono-on-one skills.
In a age when a one dimensional shooter like Lewis can get a $117 million contract, while a more talented Josh Howard gets only a four year $40 million deal and Bruce Bowen gets $4.1 million; the market is clear that one-on-one scoring is the primary basis for monster contracts. From a market standpoint, Marion is overpaid and will never live up to what people expect from a guy that expensive.
It is all about expectations. People accuse Marion of "disappearing" in the playoffs, but the stats don't support that claim. Last season Marion averaged 17.5 ppg during the regular season and averaged 15.7 ppg against the Spurs. Since the Suns averaged 10 ppg fewer points in the series, that was not a big drop in scoring. Also He shot 52.1% and 47.1% for three.
Marion averaged 9.8 rpg during the season and 10.5 ppg against the Spurs. His steals were down from 2.0 to 1.2, but his blocks were up from 1.5 to 2.3. He was given one of the most difficult defensive assignments in the NBA and still averaged 10.5 rpg.
In short, the claim Marion disappeared is a myth. All that happened is that the situation changed and the Suns needed more offense from the SF position. It's a variation on the old joke, "If you're so rich, why aren't you a better scorer?"
But he isn't a great one-on-one scorer and that's what is most valued. As long as that is how he is evaluated, it is why he feels he is not appreciated. Now for me, I'd happily give up the appreciation for $16 million, but NBA players can find all kinds of things to gripe about.
Friday, August 3, 2007
Making Layups
The Suns are widely thought of as jump shooting team, but that is not really true. The Suns ranked 7th in the NBA in the number of "in the paint" baskets: layups, dunks, tip-ins, etc.
What is more important is that they were far and away the most accurate at 64.6%. No other team averaged over 60%. The Spurs averaged 59.5% on 103 fewer in the paint shots than the Suns. (Stats taken from http://www.nba.com/hotzones/popup.html)
Suns 1633 of 2573 for 64.6%
Bobcats 1520 of 2844 for 53.2%
Bucks 1752 of 3103 for 56.5%
Bulls 1303 of 2460 for 53.1%
Cavs 1560 of 2772 for 56.3%
Celtics 1474 of 2803 for 52.6%
Clippers 1287 of 2271 for 56.7%
Grizzlies 1625 of 2911 for 55.8%
Hawks 1466 of 2719 for 53.9%
Hornets 1589 of 2950 for 53.9%
Heat 1542 of 2608 for 59.1%
Jazz 1634 of 2844 for 57.5%
Kings 1444 of 2625 for 55.0%
Knicks 1780 of 3186 for 55.9%
Lakers 1602 of 2807 for 57.1%
Magic 1661 of 2847 for 58.3%
Mavs 1238 of 2208 for 56.1%
Nets 1419 of 2547 for 55.7%
Nuggets 1814 of 3074 for 59.0%
Pacers 1367 of 2538 for 53.9%
Pistons 1317 of 2345 for 56.2%
Raptors 1335 of 2293 for 58.2%
Rockets 1319 of 2457 for 53.7%
Sixers 1469 of 2588 for 56.8%
Spurs 1530 of 2572 for 59.5%
Sonics 1600 of 2846 for 56.2%
Wolves 1311 of 2335 for 56.1%
Blazers 1469 of 2714 for 54.1%
Warriors 1846 of 3197 for 57.7%
Wizzards 1496 of 2665 for 56.1%
As expected, the big number came from Stoudemire, Marion, and Barbosa. What may be surpising is to find that Diaw ranked ahead of Nash in terms of inside shots taken and percentage made.
Banks 47 of 77 for 61.0%
Barbosa 225 of 400 for 56.9%
Bell 73 of 131 for 55.7%
Burke 16 of 27 for 59.3%
Diaw 188 of 288 for 65.3%
James Jones 15 of 26 for 57.7%
Jumaine Jones 2 of 4 for 50%
Marion 371 of 547 for 67.8%
Marks 1 of 2 for 50%
Nash 170 of 256 for 66.4%
Pike 2 of 3 for 66.6%
Rose 2 of 3 for 66.6%
Stoudemire 462 of 715 for 64.4
Thomas 59 of 94 for 62.8%
Overall was 1633 of 2573 for 64.6%
Layups are a measure of how aggressive players are at attacking the basket, seen as a percentage of shots
Banks 39.3%
Barbosa 36.0%
Bell 13.8%
Burke 41.5%
Diaw 50.6%
James Jones 5.9%
Jumaine Jones 7.8%
Marion 51.1%
Marks 33.3%
Nash 26.4%
Pike 12.0%
Rose 3.5%
Stoudemire 67.8%
Thomas 36.3%
Total 37.5%
[As a side note, Grant Hill was very effective close to the basket last season, shooting 189 of 269 for 70.3%. The 269 shots as a percentage of his total of 660 shots which was 40.8%. As advertised he is also a very good mid range shooter which is why his overall shooting percentage is 51.8%.]
Obviously the Suns are better known for the great three point shooting 785 of 1965; but their 2355 points for three is dwarfed by their 3266 points from layups.
What is more important is that they were far and away the most accurate at 64.6%. No other team averaged over 60%. The Spurs averaged 59.5% on 103 fewer in the paint shots than the Suns. (Stats taken from http://www.nba.com/hotzones/popup.html)
Suns 1633 of 2573 for 64.6%
Bobcats 1520 of 2844 for 53.2%
Bucks 1752 of 3103 for 56.5%
Bulls 1303 of 2460 for 53.1%
Cavs 1560 of 2772 for 56.3%
Celtics 1474 of 2803 for 52.6%
Clippers 1287 of 2271 for 56.7%
Grizzlies 1625 of 2911 for 55.8%
Hawks 1466 of 2719 for 53.9%
Hornets 1589 of 2950 for 53.9%
Heat 1542 of 2608 for 59.1%
Jazz 1634 of 2844 for 57.5%
Kings 1444 of 2625 for 55.0%
Knicks 1780 of 3186 for 55.9%
Lakers 1602 of 2807 for 57.1%
Magic 1661 of 2847 for 58.3%
Mavs 1238 of 2208 for 56.1%
Nets 1419 of 2547 for 55.7%
Nuggets 1814 of 3074 for 59.0%
Pacers 1367 of 2538 for 53.9%
Pistons 1317 of 2345 for 56.2%
Raptors 1335 of 2293 for 58.2%
Rockets 1319 of 2457 for 53.7%
Sixers 1469 of 2588 for 56.8%
Spurs 1530 of 2572 for 59.5%
Sonics 1600 of 2846 for 56.2%
Wolves 1311 of 2335 for 56.1%
Blazers 1469 of 2714 for 54.1%
Warriors 1846 of 3197 for 57.7%
Wizzards 1496 of 2665 for 56.1%
As expected, the big number came from Stoudemire, Marion, and Barbosa. What may be surpising is to find that Diaw ranked ahead of Nash in terms of inside shots taken and percentage made.
Banks 47 of 77 for 61.0%
Barbosa 225 of 400 for 56.9%
Bell 73 of 131 for 55.7%
Burke 16 of 27 for 59.3%
Diaw 188 of 288 for 65.3%
James Jones 15 of 26 for 57.7%
Jumaine Jones 2 of 4 for 50%
Marion 371 of 547 for 67.8%
Marks 1 of 2 for 50%
Nash 170 of 256 for 66.4%
Pike 2 of 3 for 66.6%
Rose 2 of 3 for 66.6%
Stoudemire 462 of 715 for 64.4
Thomas 59 of 94 for 62.8%
Overall was 1633 of 2573 for 64.6%
Layups are a measure of how aggressive players are at attacking the basket, seen as a percentage of shots
Banks 39.3%
Barbosa 36.0%
Bell 13.8%
Burke 41.5%
Diaw 50.6%
James Jones 5.9%
Jumaine Jones 7.8%
Marion 51.1%
Marks 33.3%
Nash 26.4%
Pike 12.0%
Rose 3.5%
Stoudemire 67.8%
Thomas 36.3%
Total 37.5%
[As a side note, Grant Hill was very effective close to the basket last season, shooting 189 of 269 for 70.3%. The 269 shots as a percentage of his total of 660 shots which was 40.8%. As advertised he is also a very good mid range shooter which is why his overall shooting percentage is 51.8%.]
Obviously the Suns are better known for the great three point shooting 785 of 1965; but their 2355 points for three is dwarfed by their 3266 points from layups.
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